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Abstract. implementation of the budget Code provisions (2001) has not improved situation in 
public sector as concerns fiscal decentralization; an opposite trend has prevailed which contributed 
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Анотація. Запровадження положень Бюджетного кодексу (2001) не поліпшило ситуації у 
державному секторі стосовно фіскальної децентралізації; переважав протилежний тренд, 
який сприяв посиленню фінансових проблем країни. 
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Fiscal decentralization is a policy and process aiming to endow local 
democracy institutes (bodies of self-government) with fiscal resources 
and responsibilities.
The scale and intensity of fiscal decentralization is preconditioned by 
peculiarities of the country’s intergovernmental fiscal relations, assign-
ment of governmental functions and revenues within its system. Thus, it 
also depends on a variety of institutional, political, and economic factors 
which shape the specific public administration sector. Ukraine as a transi-
tion country which gained independence after the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union in 1991 has inherited some issues from the soviet past that 
have an impact on its public finance. Even now the remnants of a socialist 
past, when there was no place for subnational fiscal autonomy and sound 
fiscal management, are still at play. 
After gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine, being a unitary state, 
naturally tended to practice a centralistic model of fiscal federalism 1; this 
1 According to Söderström [6], there are three possible models of fiscal federalism: 
centralistic (often seen in unitary states), fragmented localistic (mostly prevailing in fed-
eral states), and pragmatic (Scandinavia).
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fact does have an impact on the shape of its intergovernmental system in 
general, and the transfer system in particular. When analyzing the current 
legal base and actual practice of intergovernmental finance in Ukraine, 
one will find a kind of duality: on the one hand, some state functions are 
handed down through the Law on Local Self-Government to bodies of 
local self-governance of different levels, which corresponds to predic-
tions of fiscal federalism literature. However, on the other hand, actual 
implementation of these functions is mostly vested onto the national go-
vernment (further referred to as NG) bodies – district and region state 
administrations, which are appointed and accountable to the President of 
Ukraine (a minor exclusion is cities of national and regional importance 
which comprise only 0,6 % to total number of the territorial units). This 
means that actually bodies of self-government in Ukraine enjoy a very 
limited scale of own competence combined with low autonomy for its 
realization. In the course of the recent Ukrainian revolution 2013–2014, 
many subnational governments overtook the functions delegated before 
to the state administrations and began to form own executive bodies. This 
triggered the state’s decentralization efforts, which promise to result in a 
far-reaching reform of public finance aiming to significantly increase 
SNGs’ economic and fiscal weight at city and village levels.
At the beginning of the period of intensive nation-building, responsi-
bility for many public expenditures was vested onto SNGs without re-
spective compensation in the form of new revenue sources or intergo-
vernmental money transfers; this made SNGs fully dependent on the NG 
decisions. As one of the earliest studies of Ukrainian intergovernmental 
finance stated, public expenditures were assigned mainly in line with the 
principle of correspondence, but fell short in stability [2, p. 290], though 
his assignment had no legal base. In 2001, when the Budget Code was 
adopted, the delineation of responsibilities and revenue sources was done 
at last. Nevertheless, the analysis of legal rights to execute certain expen-
ditures demonstrates that most public goods delivered by SNGs actually 
belong to “delegated” responsibilities which are mandated and fiscally 
supported by the state. Lunina [8] suggested this share of stately man-
dated functions in terms of expenditures exceeds 90 % of SNGs’ expen-
diture liabilities.
Actually, even after the enactment of the Budget Code in 2001, to date 
SNGs remain deprived of the ability to manage their finance and assets. 
In many cases they formally bear responsibility for certain public func-
tions (such as general secondary education or primary health care), but 
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have no possibility to manage the basic factors affecting their expendi-
tures, such as salaries and wages; they also have no right to hire and fire 
managers of subordinated public institutions (local state administrations 
do this), or to set standards of service delivery etc. They even cannot hold 
accounts in the financial institutions of their choice – only in the State 
Treasury.
Within this context, it is worth discussing trends in public expenditure 
assignment in Ukraine, which is conventionally understood as an index of 
decentralization [1; 3]. Figure 1 demonstrates that a trend to increasing 
the relative size of public administration sector in GDP generally domi-
nates, being supported by a very slight increase in the relative role of the 
subnational sector within it. The problem with this index is that GDP ex-
penditure share does not really reflect the real extent of fiscal decentra-
lization. In Ukraine, as shown above, most public expenditures at the 
subnational level are administered by the state authorities, not by SNGs.
Figure 1. Total government share in Ukrainian GDP and subnational share in total 
government expenditures, %%
As concerns public revenues, the trends here are just the opposite. The 
data (see Table 1) demonstrates that SNGs’ role in redistribution of GDP 
has constantly diminished through the years. Starting with about 46% at 
the moment of gaining independence (1991), the total subnational share 
in public revenues (transfers excluded) has actually halved – it had 
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dropped to about 23 % by 2012. The NG has gained a much bigger role 
in subsidizing SNGs and making them more dependent on its decisions 
concerning the fiscal support granted.
Table 1. Distribution of revenues among government levels  
(intergovernmental transfers excluded), %%
Governmental levels 1991 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012
National 54,1 47,6 70,9 77,3 74,4 78,3 77,4
Total subnational 45,9 52,4 29,1 22,7 25,6 21,7 22,6
Regional 9,8 24,8 12,2 7,3 8,9 7,7 8,6
Cities of regional significance 25,6 17,6 10,2 11,3 11,8 9,4 9,2
Districts 6,3 7,5 4,8 1,8 2,4 2,1 2,1
Total for SNGs of subdistrict level 4,2 2,5 1,9 2,3 2,5 2,5 2,7
Source: Own calculations based on MoF data.
While observing two opposing trends (a growing subnational share in 
expenditures and a diminishing one in revenues) one could draw the con-
clusion that this will result in a soaring vertical imbalance, which has to 
be covered by use of vertical intergovernmental transfers. Respectively, 
the composition of subnational revenues has also changed.
An important component of intergovernmental finance in Ukraine is 
direct fiscal transfers. As the data in Table 2 demonstrates, the intergo-
vernmental transfer system in Ukraine displays the following trends: 
(a) growing dependence of SNGs on fiscal transfers, (b) gradual substi-
tution of NG’s discretionary transfers (mutual settlements and budge - 
tary loans) for formula transfers (grants) and (c) substitution of general 
transfers (“grants”) for earmarked ones (“subventions”).
Table 2. Dynamics of different types of fiscal transfers, %%
Year Transfer share in SNG total revenues
Out of total transfer mass:
Mutual 
settlements Grants
Intergovernmental 
loans Subventions
1991 14,4 34,8 55,9 9,2 –
1995 4,9 51,7 40,3 8,0 –
2000 22,9 0,2 96,5 1,9 2,4
2005 43,5 – 61,8 – 38,2
2010 48,8 – 56,8 – 43,1
2011 52,3 – 50,7 – 49,3
2012 55,2 – 48,7 – 51,3
Note: Until 1995, grants were referred to as “subventions”. 
Source: Own calculations based on MoF data.
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The growing SNG dependence on transfers could signalize a soaring 
vertical imbalance and diminishing local fiscal autonomy. An elimina-
tion of discretionary transfers could be judged as a positive deve- 
lopment, since it has made transfer allocation more objective and 
predictable. Increasing relative importance of earmarked transfers 
could be hardly judged positively, because earmarking puts additional 
restrictions on SNGs’ fiscal policy and may distort their spending 
priorities.
Among the different reasons for implementing some kind of intergo-
vernmental transfer policy, bridging the vertical fiscal gap is the less con-
troversial one. A gap between revenue capacity and expenditure liability 
of governmental levels, “vertical fiscal imbalance” (further referred to 
here as VFI), is quite big in Ukraine, as in many other transition nations. 
Conventionally, VFI could be measured as a relation between the revenue 
and expenditure shares of different governmental tiers. 
Figure 2. Subnational shares in total government revenues and expenditures  
(direct fiscal transfers excluded), %%
As shown in Figure 2, during the years 1991-1993 and in 1997, the 
subnational revenue share exceeded the expenditure share; since 1998, 
the situation has reversed: a trend towards further VFI increase has domi-
nated. In 1998, VFI was only 2,4 percent points, but it soared by 2011 by 
almost 10 times (!), reaching 20,6 percent points. The soaring VFI in 
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Ukraine contributes to the growing need for direct fiscal transfers, and to 
SNGs’ indebtedness.
Besides VFI, significant inter-territorial disparities are present in 
Ukraine, which could be measured with Gross Regional Product (further 
referred to here as GRP) and subnational per capita revenues. 
Table 3 presents data on existing economic differences among macro-
regions. In terms of economic development, the Center and the East are 
significantly ahead of the South and, especially, the West. The former are 
more specialized in manufacturing and the latter ones in agriculture. Re-
spectively, the economy of Central and Eastern macro-regions attract 
much more investment (especially DFI 1), is more export-oriented in 
comparison to the South and West. As a result, we observe a sizeable gap 
in terms of total regional production measured by GRP: production in the 
South and West comprises about half of what is produced in the Center 
and East. 
Table 3. Economic indicators of macro-regions (in per capita terms), 2012
Macro-
regions
Total annual 
investments 
UAH
Industrial
production, 
UAH
Agricultural 
production, 
UAH
Export, 
USD
Cumulative
DFI, USD
GRP, 
UAH
West 3281 11 297 4610 536 371 17 323
Center 9258 33 737 6935 1569 2155 33 956
South 5410 20 219 4221 1086 558 23 310
East 6087 49 223 3222 2402 1131 34 303
Source: Own calculations based on data of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine. 
Having in mind such significant economic differences, one should as-
sume that a situation of this type must call for a massive use of equaliza-
tion transfers because differences in per capita GRP would be reflected in 
big differentials as concerns per capita revenues and expenditures. In a 
unitary state like Ukraine, this situation would be considered as unfair. 
Inter-regional fairness should be manifested in redistribution from the ur-
banized industrial Center and East in favor of the rural agricultural South 
and West [4]. As the data in Table 4 demonstrates, these expectations are 
not fully realized. SNGs in the Center, South and East actually had the 
same level of per capita revenues at the intermediate equalization stage in 
2012 (see Table 4 below), and only the West demonstrates a significant 
deficiency as concerns revenue collection. It is no surprise that SNGs in 
1 DFI stands here for “direct foreign investments”.
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the West received also the highest revenue support in comparison to the 
other macro-regions 1.
Table 4. Per capita subnational revenues in macro-regions, 2012
Macro-
regions
Total subnational 
revenues, transfers 
excluded, UAH
Total subnational 
revenues, transfers 
included, UAH
Total subnational revenues, 
transfers included, to total 
revenues without transfers
West 1,405 4,675 3,3
Center 2,414 5,320 2,2
South 2,271 4,754 2,1
East 2,534 4,840 1,9
Source: Own calculations based on data of MoF.
A more interesting observation is the fact that SNGs virtually in 
all regions receive fiscal support from the NG that at least doubles 
their revenues. This means that fiscal equalization in Ukraine occurs 
with intensive NG intervention, unlike in the models analyzed by 
R. Musgrave [5] where the NG does not intervene into inter-territorial 
redistribution and only intermediates equalization by redistributing the 
funds.
The growing extent of NG intervention into subnational finance is ob-
jectively motivated by the substantial economic differentiation among the 
regions, and could be measured by per capita GRP, calculated in Ukraine 
since 1995. GRP is the most suitable tool for measuring interregional dif-
ferentials, as it is more strongly related to regional economic capacity 
than per capita revenues, which include net transfers. Table 5 shows the 
growing economic inequality among the regions. In 1995, the GRP maxi-
mum/minimum ratio was 2,7 to 1, but in the middle of the first decade of 
the 2000s it exceeded 6 to 1, and has remained this high. As a result, dif-
ferences in social development across the regions became more visible, 
too, triggering inter-regional and international migration of production 
factors. In addition, it generated significant differences in fiscal endow-
ment of SNGs, as data in Table 4 suggested, which required equalization 
measures from the NG’s side. 
1 It should be mentioned here that, in the long run, scale of the fiscal flows in favor 
of specific regions has changed. Data series since independence show that some shifts in 
economic development have really occurred: the South and West have demonstrated high-
er economic growth and better demographic trends in comparison to the Center and East. 
But this outdistancing is not big enough to consider the possibility of the two former over-
taking the latter within the foreseeable future [7]. 
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Table 5. Regional differentiation of per capita GRP in Ukraine (UAH)
Year Average value
Variation 
coefficient Minimum Maximum
Maximum  
to minimum
1995 970 0,232 507 1368 2,7 / 1
2000 2788 0,340 1411 5965 4,2 / 1
2005 9373 0,486 4603 28 780 6,25 / 1
2010 23 600 0,486 10 939 70 424 6,44 / 1
Source: own calculations based on MoF data.
Our analysis showed that Ukraine since independence had not taken 
definite steps in direction of real fiscal decentralization. Implementation 
of the Budget Code provisions has not reversed a general trend to fiscal 
centralization which is just opposite to the world-wide developments vec-
tor. Fiscal centralization, in its turn, called for paternalistic policy of the 
state towards regions which has its manifestations in growing scale of 
redistribution among subnational governments of different levels. The 
opportunity cost of intensive fiscal equalization includes significantly in-
creased transfer dependence of subnational governments and, as theory 
predicts, diminishing incentives for regional and local authorities in ma-
king efforts towards generating sufficient revenue flows and better expen-
diture management. 
Now we have a good chance to step a path of modern development in 
public finance by assigning subnational governments important public 
functions and granting them sufficient fiscal endowment. But this will be 
not enough in order to achieve publicly desirable results. Some institu-
tional changes like vesting local governments with majority of powers 
executed at the moment by the local state administrations, instituting 
executive bodies formed by respective local governments at district and 
region levels, granting local governments a full right to run locally pro-
vided public services in education, security, culture and healthcare 
spheres. And of course, a very important prerequisite for successful de-
centralization should be accountability of local government in order to 
minimize corruption and secure maximal community involvement into 
decision making. 
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